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The Young Democracy and the 
Legacies of the New Order
Indonesia was long subjected to Dutch colonial rule and 
ultimately fought for independence in a war that lasted 
several years. Its independence was internationally recog-
nized in 1949. The ensuing democratic phase ended after 
only a few years, because the communists, the Islamists 
and the followers of President Sukarno, the hero of the 
anti-colonial fight, all tried to enforce their own political 
models. The ensuing “Guided Democracy”, an authoritar-
ian, unstable formation under Sukarno, ended with a coup 
in the mid-1960s, in which General Suharto seized power. 
Suharto established the “New Order” (Orde Baru) and 
ruled with his protégés from 1966 onwards. 
 The military occupied key positions in the administra-
tion and was responsible for external as well as a broadly 
defined internal security according to the doctrine of dual 
function (dwifungsi). It was only in May 1998 that Presi-
dent Suharto declared his resignation, during the great fi-
nancial and global crisis (“Asian crisis”). In the wake of the 
crisis, the political system was completely reformed under 
President B.J. Habibie. In June 1999, the first essentially 
free and fair parliamentary elections since 1955 were 
conducted. The following parliamentary elections (2004, 
2009, and 2014) and direct presidential elections, which 
were introduced in 2004, took place without problems as 
well. The risk of a coup by the military, which ruled the 
country for so long, is now low. 
 The year 2001 also saw the initiation of a radical de-
centralization of the administration, a process that was 
accelerated by the direct local elections held since 2005. 
Many important decisions are now no longer only made 
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The Parliamentary Elections 
as “Pre-Elections”
On 9 April 2014, elections were held for the national par-
liament (DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat). In addition, the 
representatives of 33 provincial assemblies, 497 district 
and city assemblies, and the second chamber (DPD, De-
wan Perwakilan Daerah), which has only an advisory func-
tion, were elected. The 560 DPR members were directly 
chosen via open lists in 77 electoral districts. Almost 186 
million Indonesians were called upon to cast their votes. 
The relatively unspectacular election campaigns were 
strongly dominated by the presidential elections planned 
for early July 2014 and therefore focused more on the des-
ignated presidential candidates, Prabowo and Jokowi, and 
less on parties and platforms. 
 The Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan (PDI-P) 
prevailed with a small majority. The PDI-P is the nation-
alist opposition party led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, the 
daughter of Sukarno, and often tends to be liberal with 
regard to religious issues. The party was unable to profit 
from Jokowi’s popularity as much as most surveys had 
predicted. After a long and complicated decision-making 
process and only briefly ahead of the parliamentary elec-
tions, Jokowi had been declared the PDI-P candidate for 
the presidential elections. 
 The second-strongest force was the conservative Par-
tai Golkar. Its chairman is one of the richest Indonesians, 
Aburizal Bakrie. During the New Order (1966–1998), it 
had acted as the state party, which always won at least 
two-thirds of the votes. The nationalist Gerindra, founded 
only a few years ago by Prabowo, gained particularly 
strongly. Gerindra has been able to mobilize enormous fi-
nancial means in the last few years, and had a highly dis-
puted presidential candidate in Prabowo, who is actually 
quite popular among certain parts of the population. 
 The Partai Demokrat of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 
the governing president until October 2014, and the Is-
lamist Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) lost support. Some 
of their top functionaries have recently been involved in 
in Jakarta. The civil wars – due, at least at first glance, 
to religious and/or ethnic tensions – in some parts of 
the country (Kalimantan, Poso, Ambon, etc.) have ended. 
The once-annexed province of East Timor has been 
granted independence, despite the bitter resistance of 
parts of the military. Aceh and Papua have been given 
special autonomy rights, which at least in Aceh have led 
to the settlement of a war of secession that had lasted 
for decades. 
 Islamist terrorists, responsible for several bomb at-
tacks, such as the one in Bali in 2002, have been fought 
effectively. In recent years, the government of President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has also been able to achieve 
an average GDP growth of 6 percent, to increase foreign 
investment, and to expand welfare measures – for exam-
ple, through the introduction of a comprehensive social 
security system. 
 However, various concerns persist. Islamist terror-
ism has been weakened, but vigilante groups such as the 
Islamic Defenders Front (FPI, Front Pembela Islam) have 
been active for years and have forced Christian churches 
and mosques of the Islamic Ahmadiyah sect to close. Tacit 
support comes from parts of the highest levels of govern-
ment. Moreover, an inefficient administration and a nega-
tively perceived political elite are often viewed as being 
connected to widespread corruption. 
 The heritage of the New Order is still burdening the 
young democracy. This burden was reflected in the par-
liamentary and, specifically, the presidential elections of 
2014. The defeat of ex-general Prabowo Subianto only just 
saved the country from possible disaster. Prabowo, the 
former son-in-law of Suharto and one of the central fig-
ures within the security apparatus of the New Order, is a 
reactionary nationalist, whose commitment to democracy 
is half-hearted at best. With Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, a new 
type of politician has prevailed. He was not a member of 
the New Order elite and he represents a pragmatic, reform-
oriented policy approach. He may be able to strengthen 
the fragile democracy. 
3offs of the Partai Golkar (Hanura and the Partai NasDem, 
which participated in elections for the first time) were able 
to enter parliament. All in all, the party system is highly 
fragmented, something which will make it difficult to form 
stable coalitions.
spectacular corruption scandals, which have resulted in 
several high-ranking politicians being sentenced to pris-
on. Three smaller Islamic parties, the Partai Amanat Nasi-
onal (PAN), the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), and the 
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), as well as two split-
Party Votes in %
(1999)
Seats
(1999)
Votes in %
(2004)
Seats
(2004)
Votes in %
(2009)
Seats
(2009)
Votes in % 
(2014)
Seats 
(2014)
PDI-P 33.8 153 18.5 109 14.0 95 18.9 109
Golkar 22.5 120 21.6 128 14.4 107 14.7 91
Gerindra – – – – 4.5 26 11.8 73
PD – – 7.5 57 20,8 150 10.2 61
PKB 12.6 51 10.6 52 4.9 27 9.0 49
PAN 7.1 34 6.4 52 6.0 43 7.6 47
PKS 1.4 7 7.3 45 7.9 57 6.8 40
NasDem – – – – – – 6,7 39
PPP 10.7 58 8.2 58 5.3 37 6.5 35
Hanura – – – – 3.8 18 5.3 16
total  500**  550  560 100 560
Table 1: Results of Parliamentary Elections since 1999*
Source: Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU)
PDI-P = Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan 
(Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle)
Partai Golkar = Partai Golongan Karya (Party of Functional Groups),
Partai Gerindra = Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya 
(Great Indonesia Movement Party),
PKS = Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party), 
1999: PK = Partai Keadilan (Justice Party),
PAN = Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party),
PD = Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party),
PPP = Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party),
PKB = Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party),
Hanura = Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (People’s Conscience Party),
PPP = Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party),
Partai NasDem = Partai Nasional Demokrat (NasDem Party)
* 1999  –  2009: Only the strongest parties and those that entered parliament in 2014   ** 1999: 38 seats went directly to the military 
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a while even as a possible successor to Suharto. As the 
commander of the notorious special forces, he enjoyed the 
doubtful reputation of an uncontrollable, brutal firebrand. 
He believes that the country needs a strong leader who 
would decisively counter corruption, recover the “dignity 
of Indonesia”, and limit the excessive influence of foreign 
investors. Human rights and democracy, as his biography 
and his statements during the campaign suggested, are 
of subordinate importance to him. Prabowo wants to “re-
turn to the constitution of 1945.” It was with this demand 
and supported by, amongst others, the military that Su-
karno abolished democracy in 1959. The constitution of 
1945 gave the president far-reaching rights that became 
the backbone of the closed authoritarian regime under Su-
harto from the mid-1960s onwards. 
 Prabowo considers much that has come from the West 
to be “un-Indonesian” and expressly opposes direct elec-
tions. This would affect hundreds of local polls as well 
as the presidential election itself. While Prabowo mostly 
represents a more protectionist (or “nationalist”) policy 
platform that includes the special promotion of agriculture 
and the expansion of public debt, Jokowi supports not only 
limited protectionism, but also the promotion of small and 
medium-sized enterprises, and a number of social policy 
measures (social insurance, better access to educational 
facilities, higher minimum wages, etc.), but also the con-
tinuation of budget consolidation, which includes the fur-
ther reduction of energy subsidies. 
 In the campaign, the parties were only partially able 
to rely on the loyalty of their voters; many followers of the 
Partai Demokrat and Golkar preferred Jokowi – the lat-
ter probably mostly because of his partner, Jusuf Kalla. 
Jokowi seemed to be irrevocably in the lead just a few 
weeks before the elections. However, his lead dwindled 
and the campaign ultimately became more and more dra-
matic. The media were instrumentalized in a glaring fash-
ion. A typical example was the smear campaign against 
Jokowi, who was accused in a special edition of a tabloid 
(“Obor Rakyat”) of not being a Javanese Muslim but actu-
The Duel of Jokowi versus Prabowo
Only parties or coalitions that received at least 25 percent 
of the votes or 20 percent of the mandates in the parlia-
mentary elections were allowed to nominate candidate 
pairs for the presidential elections in July. Gerindra nomi-
nated Prabowo and coalesced with several Islamic parties 
to do so: PAN, which also appointed Hatta Rajasa as its 
vice presidential candidate; the Islamist PKS and PPP; and 
the less religious Partai Golkar. The Partai Demokrat also 
declared its support much later. 
 Jokowi was nominated by the PDI-P. His coalition con-
sisted of a traditionalist Muslim party (PKB); the Partai 
NasDem of media czar Surya Paloh; and Hanura, led by the 
former commander of the armed forces, Wiranto. Jokowi 
had declared early on that he would not – as has been com-
mon in the past – automatically reward his coalition part-
ners with ministerial positions. This decision is likely to 
have contributed to some parties’ preference for Prabowo. 
 With only two candidate pairs, it was clear that there 
would only be one round of voting. In contrast to the di-
rect presidential elections in 2004 and 2009, the polariza-
tion between the candidates was immense this time. Back 
then, the first rounds had seen five and three candidate 
pairs, respectively, face off. The differences between their 
camps were, however, not very strong. In both cases, Susi-
lo Bambang Yudhoyono had quickly turned out to be the 
clear favorite.
 The restrained and very likable Javanese Jokowi does 
not come from a rich family. He likes heavy metal music 
and dresses simply. His trademark is his checkered shirts. 
Jokowi became famous as a politician because of his short 
trips to local markets and unannounced inspections of of-
fices. He is considered highly pragmatic and incorruptible. 
He worked his way up to become a successful furniture 
trader with his diligence and skill.
 Prabowo, in contrast, is the son of a former minister 
who was one of Indonesia’s most influential economists. 
In the New Order, Prabowo was considered a promising 
candidate for the country’s highest military office, and for 
5Prabowo: A Sore Loser
Just a few hours after the polling stations had closed, some-
thing previously unimaginable happened. Prabowo’s team, 
which was advised, surprisingly, by Rob Allyn, a controver-
sial “spin doctor” from the US, referred to the quick counts 
of four previously almost unknown pollsters, all of which 
saw Prabowo and Hatta in the lead. In contrast to this, eight 
survey institutes, including the most reliable of the country, 
which had often predicted election results with great accu-
racy, each predicted the victory of Jokowi and Kalla by a 
majority of approximately five percentage points. Briefly af-
ter the elections and a bit prematurely, Jokowi therefore de-
clared himself the victor, but Prabowo also showed himself 
convinced in interviews – based on the forecast by the four 
pollsters – that the counting of votes would end in his favor. 
ally a Christian of Chinese descent. Later, the TV channel 
TVOne reported on the alleged connections of the PDI-P 
and Jokowi to the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), 
which was crushed by the new regime under Suharto in 
the mid-1960s. 
 The four factors that decided Jokowi’s victory in 
the final phase were, according to him, the house-to-
house campaigning by thousands of volunteers in the 
last days before the election; the insulting statement 
of PKS politician Fahri Hamzah, who had called Jokowi’s 
idea of introducing a day to honor Muslim scholars (a 
“Hari Santri”) “crazy” (“sinting”); the last TV debate 
between the presidential candidates; and, specifical-
ly, the “Salam 2 Jari” concert in the Bung Karno Stadium 
on 5 July, which had been supported by many pop stars.
Table 2: Profile of the Candidate Pairs
Prabowo Subianto / Hatta Rajasa Joko Widodo (“Jokowi”) / Jusuf Kalla
Candidates Ex-general and former son-in-law of Suharto (Ger-
indra) / Chairman of PAN and Coordinating Minister 
for Economic Affairs from 2009 to 2014
Governor of Jakarta (PDI-P) / Vice President from 
2004 to 2009 (Golkar) 
Supporting coalition of 
the parties represented 
in the parliament 
Gerindra; PAN; PKS; Golkar; PPP; at the last minute 
also PD; together 63 percent of the mandates
PDI-P; PKB; Hanura; Partai NasDem; together 37 
percent of the mandates
Campaign themes Calling Jokowi a “puppet” of Megawati Sukarnopu-
tri; elements of smear campaign (Jokowi supposedly 
a Christian of Chinese descent; alleged connections 
between him and PDI-P with the PKI); stressing the 
qualities of Prabowo as a leader in an aggressive 
campaign; emphasis on an Islamic identity by coali-
tion partners
Jokowi’s proximity to the people, his simple origins 
and his success as a local politician stressed; stron-
ger emphasis on multi-religious identity, at the same 
time proximity to traditionalist Islam as represented 
by PKB and Jusuf Kalla; generally less professionally 
conducted campaign than that of Prabowo
Program Prabowo represents stronger protectionism and, in 
part, aggressive nationalism; wants much higher 
public debt; strong promotion of farmers; speaks 
of a “return to the constitution of 1945”; refers to 
Sukarno and Suharto alike
Jokowi supports slight protectionism, efficient 
bureaucracy, improvement of investment conditions, 
promotion of SMEs, budget consolidation and fight 
against corruption; prosecution of past human rights 
violations; refers to Sukarno
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observers that 37 hackers from China and South Korea 
had manipulated four million votes that had not been cast. 
A day later, it emerged that these hackers did exist but 
that they had been arrested for entirely different offenses 
that had nothing at all to do with the elections. On 25 July, 
Prabowo filed a claim with the constitutional court. His 
team of 95 lawyers submitted its own calculation of the 
election results. According to them, Prabowo and Hatta re-
ceived 50.25 percent of the votes. The court is expected 
to announce its decision in this case by 22 August. This 
judgment cannot be appealed. 
 The constitutional court has made headlines lately be-
cause of a high-profile corruption case; nevertheless, it is 
assumed that the judges will not be swayed in this case. In 
light of the obviously scant “proof”, it can be expected that 
the claim will be rejected and that Jokowi and Jusuf Kalla 
will be inaugurated on 20 October.
What Does Jokowi’s Victory Mean?
In contrast to the previous elections, this year’s presi-
dential elections showed – for the first time – how frag-
ile Indonesia’s electoral democracy still is. Prabowo, an 
unpredictable candidate who virtually represented the 
authoritarianism of the New Order, was supported by a 
wide coalition, specifically the Islamic and Islamist par-
ties and the former regime party Golkar. He continues to 
attempt to seize power by almost any means. With nation-
alist slogans and his image as an unrelenting, determined 
(“tegas”) man of action, he received the support of almost 
47 percent of the voters, against a candidate deemed close 
to the people who has disassociated himself from the New 
Order, performed outstandingly successfully as a politi-
cian, and has never been seriously linked to corruption. 
 At the moment, the much-quoted “permanent coali-
tion” behind Prabowo still has a relatively high majority 
of 63 percent of the mandates behind it. However, hints of 
disintegration are showing up more and more frequently. 
The spokesman of the Partai Demokrat has already openly 
considered supporting Jokowi. In addition, the PPP had 
 It was shocking that the team around Prabowo pre-
tended for days to have won the elections, although even 
the most gullible people must have realized that the quick 
counts by the apparently well-paid survey institutes were 
nonsensical, especially since they were unwilling to dis-
close their methodology. When Prabowo realized that the 
Election Commission (KPU) would in the end come to the 
same result as the reliable survey institutes, he changed 
his tactic, attacking the KPU and also speaking of “mas-
sive, systematic” election fraud.
 In the following days, the votes were counted further 
and Prabowo’s defeat became more and more undeniable. 
Just before the final announcement of the results, Prabowo 
made another unpredictable move. He read a declaration 
in which he continued to speak of election fraud and an-
nounced that he did not intend to continue his involvement 
in the election process. His partner, Hatta Rajasa, was not 
present and had not signed the declaration. The situation in 
Jakarta was very tense, and observers feared riots.
 On 22 July, KPU announced the official final result: 
With a voter turnout of almost 71 percent, Jokowi and Kal-
la had received 53.15 percent of the votes; Prabowo and 
Hatta had received 46.85 percent. Thus, Jokowi and Kalla 
had a majority of approximately 8.4 million votes. Even 
then, Prabowo insisted that his own data, collected by the 
PKS, were correct. On 23 July, Tantowi Yahya, the spokes-
man for Prabowo’s team, declared that Prabowo had not 
withdrawn from the election process (which would have 
been contrary to legal provisions), but only from the vote-
counting process. He also spoke of irregularities at 52,000 
polling stations, which had supposedly affected 21 million 
votes. In contrast, the former chief justice of the Consti-
tutional Court, Mahfud MD, who had in the meantime 
stepped down as Prabowo’s campaign manager, declared 
that the PKS had never been able to provide any data. The 
dubious real count of the PKS, a party otherwise known for 
its professionalism, is expected to dissolve into thin air.
 On 23 July, Prabowo’s new campaign manager, ex-
general Yunus Yosfiah, reported to the surprise of many 
7 This could be a wake-up call for the entire region of 
Southeast Asia, where most countries are ruled by more or 
less authoritarian regimes. Thailand recently experienced 
another military coup, and the Philippines have been 
dominated by a small oligarchy for a long time. Indonesia 
could become the regional example of a relatively success-
ful transition to democracy. 
followed its chairman Suryadharma Ali into the coalition 
with Prabowo only reluctantly. Since Suryadharma Ali is 
suspected of corruption, the PPP may soon switch sides 
as well. Within the ranks of Golkar, demands for an ex-
traordinary party congress to depose Chairman Aburizal 
Bakrie have been made repeatedly in the last few weeks. 
 In 2004, the then newly elected President Yudhoyo-
no faced a similar problem. At that time, Jusuf Kalla, then 
vice president for the first time, assumed the chairman’s 
office from Golkar and led the party into the ruling coali-
tion. Due to the pragmatic – one could also say opportun-
ist – behavior of many party politicians, Jokowi may soon 
be able to enlarge his coalition. 
 Jokowi also depends heavily on the support of his own 
coalition, specifically the PDI-P. This party is ruled by 
Megawati together with her daughter Puan. Puan consid-
ers the PDI-P to be the property of this dynasty and alleg-
edly found Jokowi’s nomination hard to accept. The PDI-P 
expects that as the party that won the parliamentary elec-
tions and nominated Jokowi, it will play a leading role in 
the government. 
 Besides the PDI-P, there are parties in Jokowi’s coali-
tion that are not considered reform-friendly. Hanura is led 
by the former commander of the armed forces, Wiranto. 
He was, like the founder of the Partai NasDem, Surya 
Paloh, part of the New Order elite. The Islamic PKB, which 
was instrumental to Jokowi getting the votes of Mus-
lim voters in rural Java, has belonged to the conservative 
cartel of political parties in recent years. The extent to 
which Jokowi needs to incorporate questionable char-
acters was already apparent when he included former 
generals Hendropriyono and Ryamizard Ryacudu in his 
campaign team. 
 Jokowi’s victory may still be the beginning of a new 
era in Indonesian politics, if he manages to free himself 
from the embrace of his coalition partners. With a reform 
cabinet, he could be able to enforce the fight against cor-
ruption, push infrastructure projects, and slowly come to 
terms with the still-virulent legacies of the New Order. 
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